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Abstract: Based on the two-dimensional classification of quality assurance mechanisms, this study capitalizes on an 
adjustment event of quality disclosure strategy on Ctrip.com in June 2017, and uses the sales data of online outbound 
package tour products to investigate the impact of transparency of quality disclosure on sales, as well as its moderating effect 
on the relationship between eWOM valence and sales. We uncover following interesting findings as follows. First, the 
valence of eWOM has a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship with sales. Second, the transparency of quality 
disclosure has a positive moderating effect. Our study reveals how the information transparency strategy influence the 
development of the platform ecosystem. 
 




With the rapid development of Internet technologies, e-commerce platforms are becoming the leading 
innovators in China economy. However, the separation of buyers and sellers in time and space leads to the 
asymmetry of product quality disclosure and opportunistic behavior of complementors. In digital markets, 
quality assurance mechanisms, designed by e-commerce platforms, ensure the consumers’ right of knowing the 
quality information of products. 
Dranove and Jin
[1]
 classified quality assurance mechanisms into two categories: self-generated quality 
assurance and certification-based quality disclosure. Electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) is a common 
self-generated quality assurance. eWOM, generated by buyers, reduces the quality signal deviation introduced 
by the self-reported information (such as advertisements and product introductions of sellers), before the 
purchasing. The quality information in eWOM is easy to be recognized and accepted by consumers. It becomes 
a crucial regulatory approach for e-commerce platforms to promote product quality management. In addition, 
quality disclosure from third parties such as industry associations, governments, and professional organizations 
is the another important quality assurance mechanism
[2]
. However, due to the lack of professional certification 
capabilities, e-commerce platforms are still exploring how to promote quality disclosure. Current platform 
quality supervision is still in a background mode, which is obscure to consumers (such as the examinations 
before suppliers entering the platform), also there is no mature and effective front-end disclosure solution. 
Moreover, the opacity of quality disclosure mechanisms made consumers not well aware of the effectiveness of 
them, and even doubtful about them. Therefore, it may be an effective strategy to strengthen consumer 
awareness by improving the transparency of quality disclosure. 
In fact, certification-based quality disclosure mechanisms benefit from strong market power and 
administrative norms. By continuously improving the transparency of quality disclosure, relevant quality 
assurance signals are strengthened in market transactions, platform governance, and the processes of consumer 
identification. However, transparent quality disclosure yields a significant crowding out effect on low-quality 
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products, further inhibits the network effects in the two-sided market and negatively affects the market share of 
the platform. Therefore, for some growing e-commerce platforms, it is necessary to be very cautious when 
deciding which transparency strategy of assurance mechanism to use. Previous literature has confirmed that 
e-commerce platforms could reshape business models by adjusting pricing strategies and improving competition 
mechanisms based on information elements, such as product, price, cost, inventory, and process
[3, 4]
. Most 
existing researches focus on the role of price transparency strategies in B2C and B2B markets, while there are 
little researches on the transparency of product quality disclosure. Thus, our research questions are: 1) how does 
quality disclosure transparency of the platform affect online sales and 2) how does it affect the relationship 
between self-generated quality assurance and online sales? 
This study capitalizes on the opportunity of a quality disclosure strategy adjustment on Ctrip.com in June 
2017 and uses online sales data of outbound package tour products. The results confirmed the positive 
moderating effect of the transparency of quality disclosure. This paper offers more choices of non-price strategy 
in platform governance, and applies the information transparency theory to the new context of product quality 
governance on e-commerce platforms. We also provide a new evidence of the impact of information 
transparency strategy on the development of platform ecosystem. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
2.1 Two types of quality assurance mechanisms 
Quality assurance mechanisms are a set of management strategies designed to disclose quality information. 
Quality assurance mechanisms can be classified into two categories: self-generated quality assurance and 
certification-based quality disclosure
[1]
. The former mainly delivers product quality information to consumers 
through brands, guarantees and word of mouth. The latter is defined as an effort by a certification agency to 
systematically measure and report product quality. The comparison of these two types of quality assurance 
mechanisms is shown in Table 1. As indicated in this table, the quality information of self-generated quality 
assurance tends to describe the horizontal product dimensions, thus consumers can find products that best meet 
their idiosyncratic needs. The quality information provided by certification-based quality disclosure is about 
vertical product attributes. The quality of the product can be judged based on the quality disclosure information. 
These two mechanisms complement each other in the transmission of quality signals. 
Table1 Comparison of two quality assurance mechanisms 
 
Self-generated quality assurance 
mechanism  
Certification-based quality disclosure 
mechanism  
Common Transmit quality signals to consumers 
Difference 
Signal source Enterprises, consumers third-party certifiers, industries or governments 
Information verifiability difficult to verify easy to check 
Information credibility need to be identified relatively reliable 
Information representation non-standardized, different forms standardization, may be not detailed 
Relationship with quality indirectly clarify product quality directly explain the quality parameters 
Disclosure of information 
attributes 
partially, one aspect will be more 
detailed 
overall, more concentrated 
 
2.2 Quality assurance mechanisms in e-commerce platforms 
As an important self-generated quality assurance mechanism, and valence is considered as a the most 
representative metric of eWOM 
[5]
. Low valence indicates a negative attitude of customers on the product, while 
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high valence indicates a positive one. According to expectation-confirmation theory
[6]
, post-purchase 
satisfaction of a product is the function of expectation, perceived performance, and disconfirmation of belief. In 
e-commerce platforms, the low valence of a product is associated with low consumer satisfaction of the product 
quality. A severe mismatch between product quality expectation and perception leads to a reduction in product 
purchase desires. As valence increases, the gap between the expectation quality and the actual perception quality 
decreases. It indicates that the lower quality uncertainty conveyed by valence leads to higher consumers’ 
purchase desire. However, when valence is extremely high, due to the consumer's previous experiences of 
quality fraud, there may be a mismatch between pre-purchase quality expectations and post-purchase perceived 
performance, and consumers subconsciously suspect high valence
[7]
, which in turn reduces the possibility of 
purchase. Thus, we propose following hypothesis: 
H1: The relationship between valence and online sales is inverted U-shaped. 
Quality disclosure is a non-price platform governance strategy that includes design content and information 
transparency. This paper focuses on the latter. An increasing transparency of information leads to an increasing 
in information visibility and a decreasing consumer uncertainty on product perception
[8]
. It helps consumers 
differentiate product quality and guides them to make rational purchase decisions, and it is easier to find 
products that meet their needs, which results in higher purchase intentions. Thus, we propose following 
hypothesis: 
H2: The higher the transparency of quality disclosure, the higher the online sales of products. 
Two quality assurance mechanisms yield complementary effect in the dimensions of signal source, 
information verifiability, credibility, expression, and disclosure attributes. In this study, quality disclosure 
transparency is the extent to which consumers can perceive and acquire when the platform uses product 
transparency strategies to disclose quality information. The quality certification information reflects the vertical 
product attributes as a quality signal, but the information obtained by consumers is different in different 
transparency environments. When the transparency of quality disclosure is high, there will be more quality 
information of platform certification disclosure. Then, it can play the role of “quality endorsement”, so will the 
reliability of valence be further verified. Conversely, the quality endorsement doesn’t play its role in an opaque 
platform environment. Thus, we propose following hypothesis: 
H3: Compared to the lower quality transparency strategy, the higher transparency strategy mitigates 
the inverted U-shaped relationship between valence and online sales. 
 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Data and Measures 
We use the data from the largest travel e-commerce platform in China——Ctrip.com. The platform 
implemented a new quality disclosure strategy at the end of June 2017. The updated quality disclosure strategy 
re-evaluates the core service elements of all the products in the transportation, hotel, travel experience, 
restaurants and shopping arrangements, and built a new rating scheme. Therefore, the quality disclosure was 
more transparent. We collected data of outbound package tour products that leave from 15 major domestic cities 
and target at 15 major outbound destinations. The data includes the number of tourists, valence, volume, prices, 
and season. The data was collected by a script every half month from March 2017 to October 2017. 
The panel-level mode is specified in following equation: 
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Where        , is the number of tourists of product i during t period,           is the average score of the 
product i as of the t period,      is a dummy variable of the disclosure transparency. It is recorded as 0 before 
the event and 1 after the event. We also controlled the season factor, product price and review volume. We use 
dummy variables to capture the change of seasons. March and April belong to the first quarter (         ), 
May, June and July belong to the second quarter (         ), and August, September and October belong to the 
third quarter (         ).         is the listed price of product i in t period.          is the number of 
reviews of product i in t period.    are the regression coefficients and intercept term of the model.        is 
the composite error term. 
 
3.2 Results 
We use "OLS + robust standard error" method to avoid heteroscedasticity and further use fixed effect 
model to estimate the regression parameters. The results of step-by-step regression are shown in Table 1. Model 
2 shows that the coefficients of primary and secondary terms of valence are negatively significant. This result 
indicates that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between valence and sales of the tourism products. As 
valence increases, sales first increase and then decrease. The symmetric axis of the quadratic curve is 4.1. Thus, 
H1 is supported. Model 3 shows that the coefficient of quality disclosure transparency is significantly positive, 
thus H2 is supported. The results of Model 4 and Model 5 show that the transparency of quality disclosure has a 
positive moderating effect on valence, thus H3 is supported. Figure 1 is presented in order to further clarify the 
moderating effect. The steep curve tends to gentle as the transparency of quality disclosure decreases. The 
direction of the curve opening is unchanged, and the elasticity becomes smaller. 
Table 1 Estimation results 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
FE FE FE FE FE 
Constant 1.704
*** 1.874*** 1.833*** 1.999*** 1.947*** 
(0.151) (0.147) (0.150) (0.147) (0.144) 
Control variables      
Season_2 0.063
*** 0.062*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Season_3 0.253
*** 0.245*** 0.178*** 0.173*** 0.183*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
lnPrice 0.041
* 0.039* 0.025 0.024 0.026 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
lnVolume 0.636
*** 0.591*** 0.627*** 0.583*** 0.569*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 








 (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
Moderator      
PIT   0.089
*** 0.086*** 0.175*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) 
Interaction      
(lnValence)2×PIT     4.931
*** 
    (0.503) 
lnValence×PIT     1.054
*** 
    (0.067) 
N 66403 66403 66403 66403 66403 
R2 0.533 0.546 0.538 0.551 0.561 
Note: standard errors in parentheses, *p <0.05, ** p <0.01, ***p <0.001 
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Figure 1. Moderating effect of quality disclosure transparency 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS  
We have three main conclusions. First, as a self-generated quality assurance mechanism, valence has an 
inverted U-shaped effect on the online sales of outbound package tour products. It confirms the non-linear effect 
of valence on online sales, and provides an important evidence for the effectiveness of online quality signals of 
different products. Second, increased transparency in quality disclosure contributes to online sales growth. Our 
study applies the information transparency theory to the product quality governance research of e-commerce 
platforms, and provides a new evidence for the impact of information transparency strategy on the development 
of the platform ecology. Third, the increase in transparency of quality disclosure can greatly strengthen the 
relationship between valence and online sales. It broadens the views of platform product quality governance and 
supplements the research on non-price strategy in platform governance. 
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